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Abstract
This study follows the Lordan and Neumark (2018) analysis for the US, and examines
whether minimum wage increases affect employment opportunities in automatable jobs in
the UK for low-skilled low-wage workers. Overall, I find that increasing the minimum wage
decreases the share of automatable employment held by low-skilled low-wage workers, and
increases the likelihood that workers in automatable jobs become dis-employed. On aggre-
gate the effect size is modest, but I also provide evidence that these effects are larger in
more recent years. The study also highlights significant heterogeneity by industry and
demographic group, including more substantive adverse effects for older low-skilled workers
in manufacturing, as well as effects at the intensive margin.
Introduction
There are no shortage of papers that consider the effects of the minimum wage in the UK. In
general, these studies have focused on potential changes to employment opportunities for the
low skilled, and the majority suggest that overall employment effects are minimal [1–2]. How-
ever, there is evidence that specific sub groups do lose out on employment opportunities when
the minimum wage increases. This underlines the importance of considering differential
effects at the individual level to understand completely who the winners and losers are. Specifi-
cally, those that lose are part-time women [3–4], part-time workers in general [3], service
industry employees [5] and care home workers [6]. In addition, there is evidence of a signifi-
cant amount of job switching for low-paid workers after minimum wage increases, which has
associated costs [7].
Outside employment effects employers can respond in a number of other ways to increases
in the minimum wage. For example, they may alter job amenities [8] or compress wages [9–
10]. A recent paper by Lordan and Neumark [11] explores whether minimum wage affects the
employment possibilities for workers relying on automatable employment indirectly by con-
sidering if individuals in automatable jobs are more likely to lose their jobs, following mini-
mum wage increases in the US. The authors note that the adoption of new technology should
also create jobs within firms as they require different types of workers to maintain their new
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technologies, however these roles will be of higher skill than the ones the technology replaced.
A related analysis [12] analysed the susceptibility of low-wage employment to technological
substitution. This study also provides evidence that firms may automate routine jobs in
response to a minimum wage increase, reducing employment opportunities for workers in
routine jobs. Given the current attention being paid to the potential for robots to cause unre-
coverable job loss in the academic literature [13–16] the objective of this work is to replicate
Lordan and Neumark [1] for the UK. Therefore, the main contribution of this work is to be
the first exploration of this kind for the UK. Consistent with Lordan and Neumark, I empiri-
cally assess whether there are changes in i) the share of automatable employment ii) the pro-
pensity to lose employment in an automatable job iii) the propensity to switch from an
automatable job iv) the share of hours that are automatable v) the number of hours worked in
automatable jobs following a minimum wage increase.
This work is timely given the UK government has committed to regularly revising their
minimum wage policies upwards in line with the median earned wage, with the final commit-
ment being fulfilled in 2020. Therefore, my analysis has a clear and general policy perspective
given that it informs of the likelihood of losing low skilled automatable employment shares fol-
lowing minimum wage hikes, as well as highlighting what groups are the most vulnerable in
terms of any labor reallocations, in time for the next discussions on future minimum wage
increases that go beyond current commitments.
The empirical analysis draws on the Quarterly Labor Force Survey data (QLFS) from 1994–
2017. While I follow the Lordan and Neumark analysis as closely as possible, a lack of cross
area variation in the UK means that the identification strategies do diverge. In this case, the
identification strategy becomes less credible for the shares of employment analysis. However, I
address this with additional robustness analysis. Consistent with Lordan and Neumark I dis-
tinguish between occupations that are high in automatable tasks by drawing on well-accepted
US definitions [17–18]. Overall, I consistently highlight that minimum wage increases
decrease the shares of automatable employment following a minimum wage increase. On
aggregate, the effects found are modest. For example, I find that a 10% increase in the mini-
mum wage leads to a 0.11 percentage point decrease in the share of automatable jobs done by
low-skilled workers. Notably this masks a stronger effect over the last decade and a half which
is roughly double in size, implying that the importance of the interaction between the mini-
mum wage and automation has been accelerating. In addition, the aggregate effects mask
larger changes experienced by specific groups. For example, manufacturing specific estimates
imply that a 10% increase in the minimum wage leads to a 0.29 percentage point decline in the
share of automatable employment. I note that the pooled analysis also masks significant het-
erogeneity by demographic groups. Men and the oldest workers are affected the most, with
larger effects also evident for White, low-skilled workers. An analysis of hours also reveals that
there are effects at the intensive margin, in addition to the extensive margin.
Similar conclusions to the shares of employment analysis emerge in an additional analysis,
which considers the likelihood a low-skilled low-wage worker in automatable employment
remains employed in the next period as compared to a low skilled low-wage worker in non-
automatable employment following a minimum wage increase. Overall, workers in automat-
able employment are significantly less likely to keep their job and work fewer hours in the next
period, however these differences are small. Once again, the effect size roughly doubles when I
consider an analysis window between 2004–2017. I also note that those working in
manufacturing, men and the oldest workers experience greater declines (for example a 0.10
percentage point decline for low skilled manufacturing workers in automatable employment
older than forty years for every 10% increase in the minimum wage). I also find some robust
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evidence that low-skilled low-wage workers in automatable employment are more likely to
switch jobs to non-automatable work in the next period following a minimum wage increase.
Methodology
Low-skilled low-wage individuals
This analysis focuses on low-skilled low-wage individuals. I envisage a labor market that is
entirely separable by skill. That is to say low-skilled low-wage individuals cannot–at least with-
out more training which takes time–obtain a high-skill job. Therefore, this analysis may be
viewed as focusing on how minimum wage increases cause changes to the type of work avail-
able for low-skilled low-wage workers only. This is in line with the minimum wage literature
in general which focuses on the effects of increases on those that are most likely to be affected
only.
Throughout the analysis I consistently define low-skilled low-wage individuals as those
who are working in the lowest-paid occupations, while also having low levels of education. I
focus only on those born in the UK to circumvent the fact that immigration flows may cause
the composition of this group to fluctuate over time. I calculate income for each occupation in
each year, and based on this distribution only include in the analysis those in the bottom
income quintile with a GCSE equivalent or less. This intersection is important given that the
value of holding a GCSE equivalent or less changed markedly over the long-time window used
in this study. However, I note that changing the analysis to focus on those who have a GCSE
level qualification or below serves only to increase the estimate effects slightly.
Measuring automatable employment
The measure of automatable employment follows Lordan and Neumark [1] by drawing on def-
initions provided by [17–18]. Specifically, routine task intensity in each three-digit occupation
is defined as:
RTIk ¼ lnðT
R
k Þ   lnðT
M
k Þ   lnðT
A
k Þ ð1Þ
where Tk
R, Tk
M, and Tk
A are the levels of routine, manual, and abstract task inputs for occupa-
tion kmeasured at the 3-digit level (these levels are defined using variables from versions of
the Dictionary of Occupation Titles). Therefore, Eq (1) is increasing in the absolute and rela-
tive quantity of tasks that are automatable within occupation k. Eq 1 is calculated for three-
digit UK Standard Occupation Codes (SOC) 2000 occupation codes, based on standardized
Table 1. Examples of automatable job.
Automatable
Elementary administration occupations
Elementary process plant occupations
Assemblers and Routine Operatives
Food Preparation Trades
Administrative Occupations–Records
Non-Automatable
Transport Drivers and Operatives
Personal Service Occupations NEC
Metal Machining, Fitting and Instrument Making Trades
Sales Related Occupations
Customer Service Occupations
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224789.t001
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responses to these questions (mean 0 and standard deviation of 1) and matched to the QLFS
from 1992 to 2017. The coding system in the UK changed twice between 1992–2017. Between
1992- Q1 2002 the QLFS used UK SOC 90. I utilize a cross walk described in (19) to assign
each UK SOC 90 code a UK SOC 2000 value. In 2010 there was another minor coding change.
I have created a cross walk to assign a UK SOC 2000 code to each UK SOC 2010 in the QLFS.
In addition, I draw on additional cross walks [19] to allow me crosswalk the SOC 90 values to
the coding system used by the classifications of [17–18]. A job is then defined as automatable if
it is in the top tertile of Eq (1) and zero otherwise.
Automatable jobs
Table 1 provides examples of occupations that are classified as automatable and non-automat-
able. The jobs that are labelled as automatable are easily substitutable with robotics (for exam-
ple, assemblers and routine operatives) or computer software (for example, administrative
occupations in filing records). That is, the technology is readily available now. In contrast, the
jobs that are labelled as non- automatable are much less predictable in terms of their sequence
of actions (for example, transport drivers and operatives) and often require contact with clients
(for example, personal service occupations).
Shares of automatable employment analysis
Based on the definition of automatable work given by the top tertile of Eq (1) for each industry
i, within each area a (defined as government office regions in the UK), in year t, I calculate an
automatable employment share as:
RSHiat ¼ ð
PK
k¼1ðLiatÞ � 1½RTIk > RTI
P66�Þð
PK
k¼1LiatÞÞ
 1
ð2Þ
In Eq (2), Liat is equal to total employment in industry i in government area a at time t. 1[.]
takes the value of one if an occupation is in the top third of the employment-weighted distribu-
tion of RTI across occupations, using only low-skilled workers and those in the bottom quintile
of the income distribution (low-wage) as the population sample, and is zero otherwise. The
numerator is the share of automatable low-skill low-wage employment in a particular industry,
area, and year, and the denominator is total low-skilled low-wage employment in that indus-
try, location, and year. The data I draw on is the QLFS. The QLFS is the main survey of indi-
vidual economic activity in the UK, and provides the official measure of the national
unemployment rate.
Our analysis initially focuses on the following specification
RSHiat ¼ b1LogMWt þ AaλþþAtγ þ Iiφþ Xiat þ εiat ð3Þ
where LogMWt denotes the natural log of the minimum wage at time t adjusted to 2015 prices
(see data section for how minimum wage is defined). Eq (3) includes area (Aa) and industry
(Ii) fixed effects. It also includes area specific time trends (At). Standard errors are two-way
clustered by area crossed by industry and year. Xiat is a set of control variables, which may
simultaneously predict the dependent variable, while being correlated with the minimum
wage over time. These are: 1) lag of area level unemployment rate. 2) lag of Industry level
unemployment rate. 3) lagged area level demographics that vary over time: average age, educa-
tion, gender. 4) occupation demographics measured at the area/industry/year level. Specifi-
cally, these are average age, education, gender. The estimates do not change if lags are replaced
with contemporaneous values.
I am specifically interested in b1, where a negative and significant estimate implies that the
share of automatable employment is declining in response to minimum wage increases. This
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can be interpreted as evidence that minimum wage increases are interacting with automation
and causing changes to the type of work available to low-skill low-wage workers in the UK. Or
in other words it is changing the type of work available for these workers.
Following Lordan and Neumark [1] I disaggregate these effects across industries and demo-
graphic groups, to consider whether there is heterogeneity in the effects found. Consistent
with Lordan and Neumark I focus on differences by age sex, ethnicity and one-digit industry
code. For ethnicity I look at Whites, Blacks and Asian workers. Here Asian is defined as some-
one who identifies their ethnic origin as Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi. I do not look at
other ethnicities given small cell sizes. For age, I look at aged 40 and over, those aged 25 or
younger, and the intermediate group aged 26–39. To unpack these differential effects, I create
specific measures of task intensity for each subgroup (indexed by c):
RSHciat ¼ ð
PK
k¼1ðLciatÞ � 1½RTIk > RTI
P66�Þð
PK
k¼1LciatÞÞ
 1
ð4Þ
In Eq (4) the numerator is the share of automatable employment held by a particular sub-
group in a specific industry, area, and year, and the denominator is total employment of a par-
ticular subgroup by industry, area, and year. I then estimate Eq (3) separately for each sub-
group with RSH as defined in Eq (4).
Data
The main data source for the shares of employment analysis is the QLFS. These data are
matched to monthly age-specific data on the minimum wage that was gathered by the author
for this work. Following, Lordan and Neumark [1] I allow for a period of adjustment by defin-
ing the minimum wage as its average over the current month plus the last 11 months. The
minimum wage is measured in 2015 prices. I do not produce sub analysis for the one-digit
industries agriculture, forestry and fishing and energy and water as the sample sizes are too
small. I create the share of employment variable on a yearly basis, and similarly construct an
annual average of the minimum wage variables by calculating its average by industry, area and
year.
Individual-level analysis for automatable employment
I also estimate regressions using individual-level data on low-skilled low-wage individuals.
Specifically, I estimate:
EMPjiat ¼ b1ðRSHjiatLogMWatÞ þ b2RSHjiat þ TiSsγ þ Iiφþ εjiat ð5Þ
In Eq (5) Emp is the probability that the jth person is employed in industry i, area a, at time t
+1. It is assigned zero if a person was unemployed in t+1. The sample consists of those low-
skill low-wage workers employed in period t, and either employed or dis-employed in period t
+1. Eq (5) relates job loss to workers having held a routine job in period t, and facing a mini-
mum wage increase with standard errors two-way clustered by area crossed by industry and
year. b1 then captures if a person in automatable work is more vulnerable than those in non-
automatable work to job loss following a minimum wage increase. I note that Eq (5) speaks to
flows out of employment only.
Eq (5) includes area-by-year interactions, to allow for differential time patterns across
areas. The identification strategy of Eq (5) is then more conservative as compared with Eq 3
where I relied on area-specific time trends only to pick up time changes. Because of this set of
interactions the base minimum wage effect drops out when estimating Eq (5), and identifica-
tion of b1 is from variation in the availability of automatable jobs within areas across time. The
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approach is identical to Lordan and Neumark [1].. All other definitions for Eq (5) remain con-
sistent with Eqs (1) through (3). I unpack heterogeneity in b1 by estimating Eq (5) separately
by one-digit industry code, age, ethnicity and gender.
In addition, I estimate separate versions of Eq (5) that replaces the dependent variable with
another that equals one if an individual had the same 3-digit occupation code in the year of
interview, and zero otherwise (including the dis-employed). In this case, a negative and signifi-
cant b1 implies that individuals are moving from automatable work towards non-automatable
work following a minimum wage increase.
Individual level analysis data
The individual level analysis relies on the Longitudinal Labour Force Survey (LLFS), which
contains a subset of individuals interviewed in the QLFS. In the LLFS respondents are inter-
viewed five times in total–once every quarter for a year. In this analysis the first period is quar-
ter 1 and the second is quarter 5. Therefore, I calculate the probability of still being employed
one year later, and the probability of still holding the same occupation with a one-year lag.
Minimum wage is then defined at the level that was in effect when the person was interviewed
in 2015 prices.
Analysis of hours
I also consider whether minimum wage increases cause changes to hours in automatable
employment like Lordan and Neumark [1] by re-estimating Eq (3) and relating the log of min-
imum wage to the share of automatable hours. In this case, the numerator is the number of
hours worked by low-skill low-wage workers in automatable employment in a particular
industry, area and year. The denominator is the total hours worked in an area in a given year.
Finally, I re-estimate Eq (5) with the difference in reported usual weekly hours worked
between quarter 5 and quarter 1 by an individual as the dependent variable (this analysis
draws on the LLFS instead of the QLFS given I need to know what hours were worked one
year in the past as compared to the present). Specifically, I focus on those who are in employ-
ment in the two periods, and reported positive hours worked at both of these time points.
Results
Effects on employment shares
The results for the employment shares analysis (Eq (4)) are reported in Table 2. From Column
(1), the pooled analysis suggests that a 10% increase in the minimum wage leads to a 0.11 per-
centage point decrease in the share of automatable jobs done by low-skilled workers. This is
roughly 1/3 of the overall effect found in Lordan and Neumark [1].
Consistent with Lordan and Neumark [1] the sub analysis reveals that selected industries
are driving the overall effect, in this case manufacturing and banking. In manufacturing, the
effects are the largest suggesting that a minimum wage increase of 10% leads to a 0.29 percent-
age point decrease in the share of automatable jobs done by low-skilled low -wage workers in
manufacturing. The respective decline for banking and finance is 0.10 percentage points.
Notably, in Lordan and Neumark [1] the finance industries effect is zero, and the overall effect
found is driven solely by manufacturing.
Table 3 disaggregates the analysis by age, gender and ethnicity. Considering the age esti-
mates in Table 3, from Column (1), the shares of automatable jobs for low skilled older work-
ers (� 40 years old) are the most affected. For example, for workers who are 40 years or older a
minimum wage increase of 10% leads to a 0.25 percentage point decrease in the share of
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automatable jobs overall, with a 0.55 percentage point decline being implied for manufactur-
ing, and separately a 0.07 percentage point decline being implied for banking and finance. For
workers aged between 26 and 39 the overall effect is centered around zero and not significant,
however the estimates do imply that a minimum wage increase of 10% leads to a 0.1 percentage
point decline in the share of automatable jobs available to these workers in manufacturing. For
workers aged younger than 25 years, there are significant effects for the shares of employment
analysis for the sub analysis of banking and finance as well as manufacturing. Specifically, the
estimates imply that a minimum wage increase of 10% leads to a 0.06 and 0.08 percentage
point decline in the share of automatable jobs available to these workers in these industries
respectively.
From Table 3, minimum wage changes predict more movement in the shares of automat-
able employment for men as compared with women. The estimates imply a minimum wage
increase of 10% leads to a 0.18 percentage point decline in the share of automatable jobs for
men versus 0.05 percentage points for women. Notably, the effects for manufacturing are
again more substantive for both genders. For example, the share of automatable employment
for men decreases by 0.39 percentage points in response to a 10% increase in the minimum
wage. In comparison, for women, this fall is more modest at 0.18 percentage points. Table 3
also documents significant declines for men’s share of automatable employment in banking
and finance.
Table 3 also disaggregates the estimates from Table 2 by ethnicity. For Whites, the signifi-
cant pooled estimates are largely driven by changes to the share of low-skilled jobs that are
automatable in manufacturing. For example, the pooled analysis implies that a 10% increase in
the minimum wage leads to a 0.18 percentage point decline in the share of automatable
employment, compared to 0.30 for manufacturing alone. The overall effect for the Asian and
Black shares of employment analysis is centered around zero and not significant. Notably, the
shares to be significantly affected for Asian and Black workers pertain to banking and finance.
Specifically, the estimates in Table 3 imply that a 10% increase in the minimum wage increase
causes a 0.03 and 0.01 percentage point decline in the share of automatable employment avail-
able for low skilled Asian and Black workers respectively.
The hypothesis of this work is that minimum wage increases accelerates a firm’s decision to
automate tasks previously done by low-skilled low-wage individuals more quickly. A natural
Table 2. Shares of employment analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled Manufacturing Construction Hotels and
Restaurants
Transport and
Communication
Banking and
Finance
P Admin Educ and
Health
Other
Services
Dependent Variable = Share of Automatable Employment
MinWage -0.0112 -0.0288 0.0006 -0.0079 0.0018 -0.0102 -0.0030 -0.0021
(0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0004) (0.0050) (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0014)
N 4320 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Notes: OLS coefficient estimates are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Min Wage is in log form. Standard errors are double clustered by area crossed by
industry and year. Low-skilled workers are defined as those who have a GCSE equivalent or less. The definition of automatable employment follows Autor and Dorn
(2013) and Autor et al. (2015) and is consistent with that used by Lordan and Neumark (2018). A job is classified as automatable at the three-digit occupation code level.
The share of automatable employment is calculated by industry, state, and year. All regressions include area fixed effects and area specific time trends. Regressions also
include other control variables. These are: 1) Lag of Area level unemployment rate. 2) Lag of Industry level unemployment rate. 3) Lagged Area level demographics that
vary over time: average age, education, gender. 4) Occupation demographics measured at the area/industry/year level. Specifically, these are average age, education,
gender. All lagged variables relate to one year. I note that the estimates do not change notably (to the third decimal place) if lags are replaced with contemporaneous
values.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224789.t002
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falsification for the shares of employment analysis emerges which re-calculates the shares of
automatable employment for the highest-skilled group. I define the highest-skilled group as
those with a university degree who work in occupations in the highest income quantile. Given
my hypothesis I expect that minimum wage changes will have zero effect on the shares of
employment of the highest skilled, or indeed positive effects if it is individuals of the highest
skill that are hired as complements to the new technology. I document the results from these
Table 3. Shares of employment analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled Manufacturing Construction Hotels and
Restaurants
Transport and
Communication
Banking and
Finance
P Admin Educ and
Health
Other
Services
40 years old +
Min
Wage
-0.0251 -0.0549 -0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0074 -0.0014 -0.0011
(0.0050) (0.0130) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0003)
N 4320 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
26–39 Years Old
-0.0011 -0.0098 0.0020 0.0020 -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0005)
N 4320 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
25 years or younger
-0.0044 -0.0064 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0075 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0026) (0.0005) (0.0002)
N 3263 426 383 431 383 442 443 480
Women
Min
Wage
-0.0053 -0.0180 -0.0008 -0.0026 0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0017 0.0000
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0003)
N 4320 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Men
Min
Wage
-0.0177 -0.0390 -0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0012 -0.0047 -0.0035 -0.0018
(0.0030) (0.0055) (0.0004) (0.0028) (0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0007)
N 4320 480 480 480 480 480 480 427
White
-0.0184 -0.0299 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0056 -0.0020 -0.0018
(0.0057) (0.0070) (0.0006) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0014)
N 4320 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Black
Min
Wage
-0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0013 0.0003 -0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002)
N 3612 452 440 451 445 455 459 443
Asian
Min
Wage
-0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0006)
N 3486 370 396 358 369 383 390 410
Notes: See Notes to Table 2
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224789.t003
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analyses in S1 File. I note that most estimates are centred around zero, with no coefficient that
is statistically significant from zero.
Proportion of workers paid less than the minimum wage:
This work relies on the QLFS, which consistently identifies twenty government regions across
the period of analysis. It is reasonable to hypothesize that minimum wage increases can have
varying effects depending on the proportion of the population affected by increases. Therefore,
I also re-estimated Eq (3) and replaced the minimum wage variable with the proportion of
workers paid less per hour than the minimum wage one year before the minimum wage was
introduced in a particular area, as defined by hourly wage if reported, or wage per hour con-
structed from gross weekly wages divided by the number of usual weekly hours when not. This
captures the proportion of workers who would expect to get a minimum wage increase in one
year’s time if they remain employed. An advantage of this strategy is that it creates cross area
variation, so I can replace the area specific time trends with area-specific year dummies, which
is more conservative and more consistent with the approach taken to control variables by Lor-
dan and Neumark [1]. The results for this analysis are provided in Table 4. Overall, there is
concordance with what has gone before. That is, the overall effects on the shares of employ-
ment are modest, but there is evidence of more substantive changes in the shares of employ-
ment for manufacturing, men and older workers.
Effects on remaining employed
The shares of employment analyses highlight the possibility that the absolute number of low
skilled automatable jobs decreased in the last three decades in response to changes in the mini-
mum wage. These effects are mostly concentrated in manufacturing. However, there are two
reasons why I may get negative and significant effects in my shares of employment analysis.
The first is job loss. However, it is also possible that the numerator is growing, implying that
there are actually job gains in non-automatable low skilled jobs.
To consider whether a higher minimum wage actually increases dis-employment among
low-skilled low-wage workers who were in automatable employment relative to workers in
non-automatable work, Table 5 reports estimates of Eq (5), which models the effects of the
minimum wage on the probability a particular individual who holds an automatable is still
employed, as opposed to being dis-employed, compared to those in non-automatable work.
Given the effect is identified from the interaction between minimum wages and being in auto-
matable work, the baseline minimum wage effect is then not identified because of the inclusion
of year�area fixed effects.
From Table 5 Column (1), I find evidence of significant declines in the probability of
remaining employed in the next period–and hence being dis-employed–for those who were
previously in automatable jobs as compared with those in non-automatable jobs. Specifically,
the estimates imply declines in the probability of employment, from a 10% minimum wage
increase, of 0.19 percentage points, with declines specific to manufacturing being 0.28 percent-
age points. The latter compares to a 0.48 percentage point decline found in Lordan and Neu-
mark [1].
There is overall robustness in the estimated effects by sub-group, as compared with the
shares of employment analyses. The most adverse employment effects are for the oldest
(greater than 40 years) workers. Specifically, there are small but significant declines in the
probability of employment of 0.03 percentage points for low-skilled workers in automatable
employment, following a 10% increase in the minimum wage, who are> = 40 years as com-
pared with comparable persons in non-automatable employment. The declines are again
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mainly driven by manufacturing (an implied decrease of 0.1 percentage points). Men in auto-
matable work also experience a greater threat of dis-employment as compared to women, with
significant declines in response to a 10% increase in the minimum wage in manufacturing,
banking and finance and other services. Specifically, the declines expected are 0.08, 0.03 and
0.06 percentage points respectively. Looking at the effects by race, the pooled estimates are
negative and significant for White workers, with these effects being driven mainly by declines
in manufacturing. For example, a 10% increase in the minimum wage reduces by 0.08 percent-
age points the overall probability of remaining employed in the next period for White low
skilled low wage workers in automatable employment. The effects for Black and Asian workers
are noisy, but do suggest significant declines in banking and finance for Asian workers (0.04
percentage point decline).
Hours effects
It is also possible that firms substitute with technology and decrease the hours of their employ-
ees, rather than culling their jobs I consider this explicitly by re-estimating Eq (4) and relating
minimum wage variation to an alternate dependent variable. Here, the dependent variable is
the share of hours worked among low-skill workers in automatable employment, in a particu-
lar industry, area, and year.
I also re-estimate Eq (7) with the difference in reported usual hours worked between this
year and last year by an individual as the dependent variable. I focus only on those who are
employed in the two periods (quarter 1 and quarter 5) and report non-zero working hours in
both periods.
The results for the shares of hours analysis are reported in Table 6. The pooled estimates
imply that minimum wage increases do decrease shares of hours for low-skilled low-wage
workers in automatable employment significantly. For example, a 10% increase in the mini-
mum wage causes a 0.04 percentage point decrease in the share of hours in automatable jobs
done by low-skilled low-wage workers overall. The estimated declines in manufacturing are
0.19 percentage points. Consistent with the share of employment analysis, the share of hours
analysis suggests that men are most affected at the intensive margins, along with the oldest and
White workers.
Table 4. Alternative minimumwage definition.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled Manufacturing Construction Hotels and
Restaurants
Transport and
Communication
Banking and
Finance
P Admin Educ and
Health
Other
Services
Dependent Variable = Share of Automatable Employment
Min
Wage
-0.0212 -0.1923 -0.019 -0.0052 0.0001 -0.0241 -0.0048 -0.0131
(0.0032) (0.0114) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0071) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0039)
N 4320 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Men Women > = 40 years <40 years&>25
years
<25 Years White Black Asian
Min
Wage
-0.0178 -0.0099 -0.0381 -0.040 -0.0154 -0.0099 -0.0005 -0.0024
(0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0039) (0.0004) (0.0011)
N 4320 4320 4320 4320 3263 4320 3612 3486
Notes: See Notes to Table 2
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224789.t004
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The individual-level analysis considers the difference in the usual hours worked per week
between quarter 1 and quarter 5. Based on the pooled estimate, a 10% increase in the mini-
mum wage generates a 0.08 decrease in weekly hours worked for low-skilled individuals who
Table 5. Individual level estimates: Probability of being employed in the next period.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled Manufacturing Construction Hotels and
Restaurants
Transport and
Communication
Banking and
Finance
P Admin Educ and
Health
Other
Services
Full Sample
Min Wage -0.0019 -0.0028 -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0020
�Automatable (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0018)
N 440614 75965 20858 58546 45190 60430 108347 37373
> = 40 years
Min Wage -0.0033 -0.0098 -0.0012 0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0021 0.0004 -0.0028
�Automatable (0.0010) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0025)
N 211312 40560 9636 24065 28711 22378 45870 13410
>25 years and<40 years
Min Wage -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0025 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0004
�Automatable (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0014)
N 196397 32436 9912 28804 15179 34140 52525 18041
<25 years
Min Wage -0.0010 -0.0072 0.0057 -0.0015 -0.0115 0.0005 0.0003 0.0054
�Automatable (0.0050) (0.0035) (0.0124) (0.0053) (0.0098) (0.0068) (0.0054) (0.0105)
N 32905 2969 1310 5677 1300 3912 9952 5922
Men
Min Wage -0.0045 -0.0082 -0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0030 -0.0032 -0.0059
�Automatable (0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0031)
N 249302 49097 15500 35345 29167 33387 35928 25611
Women
Min Wage -0.0023 -0.0044 -0.0022 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0023 0.0000 -0.0005
�Automatable (0.0009) (0.0031) (0.0048) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0020)
N 191312 26868 5358 23201 15993 27043 72419 11762
White
Min Wage -0.0015 -0.0077 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0009 0.0016
�Automatable (0.0004) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0007) (0.0017)
N 71631 18622 51732 42758 55037 100398 30263 2787
Black
Min Wage -0.0028 -0.0095 0.0053 -0.0014 -0.0031 -0.0048 0.0057 0.0069
�Automatable (0.0039) (0.0081) (0.0047) (0.0025) (0.0121) (0.0069) (0.0047) (0.0074)
N 18921 2348 983 2897 854 2635 3488 3697
Asian
Min Wage -0.0017 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0056 -0.0042 -0.0040 0.0035 0.0000
�Automatable (0.0067) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0000)
N 20362 1986 1253 3917 1578 2758 4461 3413
Notes: OLS coefficient estimates are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered by area crossed by industry and year. Low-
skilled workers are defined as those who have a GCSE equivalent or less and work in an occupation that is in the lowest quantile of the income distribution. The
definition of automatable employment is created from variables in the UK Skills and Employment Surveys Series Dataset. A job is classified as automatable at the three-
digit occupation code level. The share of automatable employment is calculated by industry, state, and year. All regressions include area crossed by year fixed effects. The
pooled regression also has industry fixed effects. The minimum wage is measured in 2015 prices.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224789.t005
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held an automatable job in the previous period. In Table 6 the declines are only statistically sig-
nificant in manufacturing for low-skilled low-wage individuals in automatable work. Turning
to the sub analysis by gender, men again are more affected than women, but none of the other
estimates are statistically significant. Overall the hours analysis reveals that there are effects at
the intensive margin, in addition to the extensive margin.
Effects on occupational switching
Table 7 reports results from an analysis where the dependent variable is equal to one if an indi-
vidual stayed in the same occupation in the fifth quarter, and zero otherwise. Thesample
Table 6. Hours based analysis.
Pooled Manufacturing Construction Hotels and
Restaurants
Transport and
Communication
Banking and
Finance
P Admin Educ and
Health
Other
Services
Dependent Variable = Share of Automatable Hours
Min Wage -0.0037 -0.0187 0.0027 -0.0022 0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0034 0.0025
(0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0039) (0.0023) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0015)
N 4320 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
Men Women > = 40 years <40 years&>25
years
<25 Years White Black Asian
Min Wage -0.0049 0.0003 -0.0060 -0.0034��� -0.0020 -0.0041 -0.0007 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002)
N 4320 4320 4320 4320 3263 4320 3612 3486
Dependent Variable = Difference in Hours between t and t+1 : Automatable Analysis
Pooled Manufacturing Construction Hotels and
Restaurants
Transport and
Communication
Banking and
Finance
P Admin Educ and
Health
Other
Services
Min Wage -0.0843 -0.7993 -0.2683 0.0935 -0.2260 -0.1941 -0.1043 -0.2516
�Automatable (0.0402) (0.1637) (0.2808) (0.2646) (0.2267) (0.1381) (0.1827) (0.2531)
N 427309 69105 19483 56191 43886 58664 97180 36041
Men Women > = 40 years <40 years&>25
years
<25 Years White Black Asian
Min Wage -0.2044 0.1677 -0.1627 0.0390 0.2586 -0.0093 -0.2767 0.0518
�Automatable (0.0634) (0.1517) (0.1843) (0.1383) (0.3347) (0.0173) (0.5117) (0.0026)
N 4320 4320 4320 4320 3263 4320 3612 3486
Notes: See notes to Table 5.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224789.t006
Table 7. Occupation stayers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled Manufacturing Construction Hotels and
Restaurants
Transport and
Communication
Banking and
Finance
P Admin Educ and
Health
Other
Services
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being employed in the Next Period: Automatable Analysis
Min Wage -0.0016 -0.0070 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0065 0.0002 0.0000
�Automatable (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0004)
N 400613 74192 19916 58401 44903 59846 99876 35417
Men Women > = 40 years <40 years&>25
years
<25 Years White Black Asian
Min Wage -0.0033 0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0051 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0029 0.0012
�Automatable (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0014)
N 239607 161006 181099 195418 24096 366721 16018 17874
Notes: See notes to Table 5.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224789.t007
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includes all those employed in quarter 1 who have valid 3-digit occupation codes. Thus, the
estimated effect of the minimum wage-routine interaction captures the change in job opportu-
nities in the worker’s initial occupation, with a “decline” defined as either dis-employment or a
change of job.
From Table 7 manufacturing and banking and finance have relatively comparable esti-
mates, suggesting that higher minimum wages lead to some occupational switching among
low-skilled low-wage workers in automatable jobs in these industries, in addition to transitions
to dis-employment. Workers between the ages of 26 and 39 years have the largest effects,
implying a greater propensity to switch because of automation. Given that the oldest workers
were the most likely to lose their jobs in response to a minimum wage increase, this suggests
middle-aged workers are more able to respond to higher minimum wages by getting an alter-
native occupation, but are suffering the switching costs. Low-skilled men in automatable work
are more likely to switch jobs in response to a minimum wage increase, as compared with
women. Finally, low-skilled Black workers are most likely to switch jobs in response to a mini-
mum wage increase, suggesting that Black workers may also be more resilient to job loss with
respect to job search.
Contemporary analysis
The effects found so far are relatively modest and a question arises as to whether the effects are
larger for a more recent sub-period, given that advances in technology moved forward with
time and the associated cost fell. To explore this, similar to Lordan and Neumark [1] I re-esti-
mate Eq 3 for the share of employment analysis and Eq 5 for the probability of remaining
employed analysis for the period 2004 to 2017. The estimates are documented in Table 8 and it
is notable that they are roughly double the size of those documented in Tables 2, 3 and 5 for
sub-groups where significant effects were originally found, namely manufacturing, men, older
andWhite workers. For example, for manufacturing, the shares of employment analysis in
Table 4 suggest that a minimum wage increase of 10% leads to a 0.47 percentage point decrease
in the share of automatable jobs done by low-skilled low -wage workers in manufacturing for
the period 2004 to 2017. This compares to 0.28 in Table 2.
In addition, the estimates in the shares of employment analysis are significant and negative,
albeit modest, for hotels and restaurants, banking and finance, public administration, educa-
tion and health and other services. Overall, Table 8 suggests that the average effects calculated
for the period 1994–2017 mask larger effects that occurred over the last decade and a half.
Conclusions
In 2020 the minimum wage will be 60 per cent of median hourly earnings, around £8.75 in the
UK, after experiencing continuous annual increases since its introduction in 1999. Given this
trend, this study explores whether these previous minimum wage increases have affected the
employment possibilities for low skilled low wage workers relying on automatable employ-
ment, following Lordan and Neumark [1]. Drawing on the QLFS from 1994–2017 and classify-
ing each occupation as either automatable or non-automatable I consistently highlight that
minimum wage increases significantly decrease the shares of automatable employment avail-
able to low-skilled low-wage workers following a minimum wage increase. However, these
effects are modest in size. For example, an increase of 10% in the minimum wage implies a
0.11 percentage point decrease in the shares of automatable employment. This effect is about
one third the size found by Lordan and Neumark [1] for the US. However, these aggregate
effects mask larger changes for manufacturing, older workers, men andWhite workers. In
addition, I also present estimates for 2004–2017 which illustrate an effect that is roughly
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double in size. This suggest that the interaction between the minimum wage and automation
has been accelerating as technology advanced, its price falls and the minimum wage increases.
A consistent narrative also emerges for an analysis which considers the likelihood a low-
skilled low-wage worker in automatable employment remains employed in the next year, as
compared to a comparable worker in non-automatable employment following a minimum
wage increase. Specifically, while aggregate effects are modest the sub-analysis reveals that
workers in manufacturing are the most vulnerable to the loss of automatable work, as well as
low skilled men, White and older workers. I also highlight that the same types of low-skilled
low-wage workers in automatable employment are more likely to switch jobs in the next
period following a minimum wage increase. An analysis of hours also reveals that there are
effects at the intensive margins. In addition, an analysis from 2004–2017 reveals estimates that
are substantively larger, once again suggesting that the average estimates I have identified
between 1994–2017 were increasing over time.
Overall, this study suggests that firms may re-assess their production processes following
minimum wage increases. Given that the analysis for a more recent sub period (2004–2017)
suggests that the effects found are increasing over time I emphasis the importance of taking
the potential for automation to interact with the minimum wage seriously. Given that the costs
of technology continue to fall, and many more low skill jobs are on stream to be automated in
the future (including security guard, driver shelf stacker and brick layer), while the effects
found in this study are modest, they should not be used to predict the future. Rather, monitor-
ing of these trends, and ensuring that low skilled low wage individuals are not unduly hurt by
the advent of the 4th industrial revolution is a key role for government and social science
researchers.
Table 8. Contemporary analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled Manufacturing Construction Hotels and
Restaurants
Transport and
Communication
Banking and
Finance
P Admin Educ and
Health
Other
Services
Dependent Variable = Share of Employment
Min Wage -0.0131 -0.0471 -0.0001 -0.0049 0.0030 -0.0069 -0.0094 -0.0056
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0016)
N 2340 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
Men Women > = 40 years <40 years&>25
years
<25 Years White Black Asian
Min Wage -0.0293 -0.0018 -0.0375 -0.0049 -0.0024 -0.0308 -0.0066 -0.0000
(0.0042) (0.0011) (0.0055) (0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0051) (0.0022) (0.0001)
N 2340 2340 2340 2340 2340 2321 1150 793
Dependent Variable = Probability of Being Unemployed
Pooled Manufacturing Construction Hotels and
Restaurants
Transport and
Communication
Banking and
Finance
P Admin Educ and
Health
Other
Services
Min Wage -0.0035 -0.0061 0.0035 -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0044 0.0007 -0.0026
�Automatable (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0010) (0.0022)
N 256411 39918 11415 28651 25009 32712 52196 20721
Men Women > = 40 years <40 years&>25
years
<25 Years White Black Asian
Min Wage -0.0026 -0.0006 -0.0043 -0.0029 -0.0022 -0.0036 -0.0033 -0.0005
�Automatable (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0039) (0.0066)
N 154870 10541 133437 100908 22066 38484 10269 12455
Notes: See notes to Table 2 and Table 8
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0224789.t008
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